Token-Holder Revenue (30d)

Some protocols route a slice of fees to holders of their token. The mechanisms differ sharply: Ethereum's EIP-1559 destroys the base fee, which reduces supply for every holder pro rata, while other protocols buy their token on the open market or stream a share of fees to stakers, sometimes in a stablecoin. This metric adds those routes into one figure covering the trailing thirty days.

How it is computed

sum over the last 30 days of fees burned, fees used for token buybacks, and fees distributed to token holders or stakers

Where it misleads

A burn is not a payment: no holder receives anything, and the benefit exists only through reduced supply, which changes value only if demand is unchanged. Some adapters classify all treasury inflows as holder revenue even where the treasury is controlled by a multisig and has never distributed anything to holders. Fee switches are governance parameters that can be enabled or disabled between periods, producing step changes that resemble growth but are votes. Distributions paid in a stablecoin and distributions paid in the protocol's own newly issued token are added together despite being economically different, and where a distribution goes only to stakers, the non-staking holder receives nothing.

The equity comparison, and why it fails

Dividends plus buybacks. The analogy fails because nothing is declared by a board, there is no record date or entitlement, and a token burn is a supply reduction rather than a transfer of cash to an owner.

Reading a high or a low value

A higher figure means more fee income was routed toward holders over the month by burn, buyback, or distribution. The mechanism matters more than the level, since a burn and a cash distribution reach a holder in different ways.