Mercenary Liquidity
Deposits and trading depth that exist only because a token subsidy pays for them, and that leave promptly when the subsidy stops or moves.
How it happens
Protocols bootstrap usage by paying token rewards to anyone who deposits assets or provides liquidity, which converts an emissions budget into a headline total value locked. The capital that responds to this is generally rate-seeking and automated, and it compares the reward yield against the fees, the impermanent loss of an automated market maker position, and whatever a competing program pays. When emissions are cut, the reward token's price falls, or a rival launches a richer program, the same capital rotates out within days because nothing about the position was sticky. What remains afterward is the organic base: deposits that stay for the fees, the borrowing utility, or the settlement function alone.
What you can actually observe
Compare rewards paid per unit of value locked against fees earned by that same capital, and look at what share of total value locked sits in incentivized pools versus uncompensated ones. Retention after an emissions reduction is the direct test and is visible in historical value-locked series aligned to governance votes. Depositor concentration and the age distribution of positions show whether the capital is a handful of rotating addresses or a broad base.
Precedent
The 2020 launch of SushiSwap drew a large share of a competing exchange's liquidity within days by paying token rewards, and a substantial portion moved again once the incentives changed.
What makes it more or less material
Look at the ratio of incentives paid to fees generated, the share of deposits in incentivized pools, historical retention after emission cuts, and how concentrated the depositor base is.
Related factors
Assets this applies to
The largest assets we classify in the categories this factor applies to. Presence here means the factor is relevant to that kind of asset, not that it has occurred.