起こりうるリスク

A small set of keys can pause, upgrade, mint, or move assets, so the system's safety depends on those keyholders and their operational security.

根拠: Enumerate the privileged roles in the deployed contracts and resolve each to an address, then check whether that address is an externally owned account, a multisig, or a timelock, and what the multisig threshold and signer count are. Check whether signers are…

Decisions are made by a foundation, core developers, or private discussion, with token voting confirming outcomes rather than determining them.

根拠: Read the foundation's own disclosures: treasury addresses and holdings, grant reports, employment of core developers, and whether it holds any protocol keys. Trace where proposals originate and how much changes between first draft and final vote, and check…

Token votes decide protocol parameters, but only a small share of tokens usually votes, so a modest holding can carry a proposal.

根拠: Read turnout as a share of circulating supply for each historical proposal rather than for a single flagship vote, and read the quorum rule and how it is calculated. Check whether voting power is snapshotted before a proposal is announced, whether tokens in…

The contract that holds funds can be pointed at new code, so the audited behavior of today is not necessarily the behavior of tomorrow.

根拠: Check whether the address is a proxy by reading the standard implementation and admin storage slots, then identify who holds the upgrade right and whether upgrades pass a timelock. Count how many times the implementation has changed and compare the currently…

Voting power is proportional to tokens held, so a few large holders can determine outcomes regardless of how many other participants disagree.

根拠: Look at the distribution of voting power across the top delegates and holders, and compute how many addresses are needed to reach a majority of a typical vote, which is a governance analogue of a concentration coefficient. Check whether custodial addresses…